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What’s Wrong with Strong Necessities? 
Philip Goff and David Papineau 
 
1 The Significance of Strong Necessities 
 
1.1 Conceivability and PossibilityDavid Chalmers’ challenge to physicalism has dominated the 
philosophy of mind for the last seventeen years.  His 1995paper ‘Facing up to the Problem of 
Consciousness’ and his 1996 book The Conscious Mind reinvigorated the debate between 
physicalists and dualists.  But Chalmers’ mature attack on physicalism appeared over a decade later 
in his extensive 2009 paper ‘The Two-Dimensional Argument against Materialism’, reprinted in this 
volume. 
 
Chalmers’ argument against a posteriori physicalism starts with the conceivable separation of mind 
and brain.  It makes conceptual sense that a being that who shares all my physical properties should 
nevertheless have no conscious life.  Zombies are conceivable. 
 
Chalmers then aims to move from the conceivability of zombies to their metaphysical possibility.  If 
this move is granted, it follows that physicalism is false.  If it is metaphysically possible that a being 
share my physical properties but not my conscious properties, then my physical properties cannot 
metaphysically determine my conscious ones.  But obviously the move from conceivability to 
possibility cannot be immediate.  As Kripke’s work made clear, a statement can be conceivably true 
and yet not possibly true: ‘Water is not H2O’ is conceivably true and yet is true at no metaphysically 
possible world. 
 
However, Chalmers claims that there is a further aspect to Kripke’s work, which implies that any 
statement that is conceivably true, even if it is not possibly true, expressesa genuine possibility: 
‘Water is not H2O’ is true at no possible world, and yet that sentence expresses the 
genuinepossibility in which the colourless, odourless stuff in oceans and lakes is not H2O.  Similarly, 
there is no possible world at which ‘Hesperus is not Phosphorus’ is true, and yet that sentence 
expresses the possible situation in which the star seen in the morning is different from the star seen 
in the evening. (The two-dimensional framework spells out the exact relationship between these 
sentences and the possibility allegedly expressed – we will explain the two-dimensional framework 
below.) 
 
Chalmers advocates a general principle according to which every conceivably true sentence 
expresses a genuine possibility. He then goes on to show that the genuine possibility expressed by 
sentences about zombie worlds is sufficient to refute physicalism. 
 
1.2 Strong NecessitiesButis it a general principle that every conceivably true sentence expresses a 
genuine possibility?  Why should there not be some brutely a posteriori necessary truths—‘strong 
necessities’ whose falsity is conceivable yet where no genuine possibility corresponds to the 
conceived falsity?  Take ‘Cicero = Tully’, for example.   The falsity of this claim is clearly conceivable.  
Yet it is by no means obvious that this conceivability points to any genuine possibility.  Why can’t we 
simply frame the thought that Cicero . . . is-not . . . Tully, even though there is no way of construing 
this thought as other than a straight impossibility? 
 
If brute necessities of this kind are to be ruled out, it must be because, for any a posteriori necessity, 
the terms involved have extra content in addition to their referent.  ‘Water’ does not just refer to 
H2O, but expresses the property of being the colourless, odourless liquid in oceans and lakes.  
‘Hesperus’ does not just refer to Venus, but expresses the property of beingthe heavenly body 
visible in the evening.  It is these extra contents that allow us to construct ‘surrogate’ possibilities of 
dissociation alongside the necessities that water is H2O and Hesperus is Phosphorous.  (The extra 
contents correspond to Chalmers’ ‘primary intensions’—again we will explain all this in more detail 
below.) 
 
But why, to press the question, should there always be such extra content?  Why shouldn’t some 
terms simply refer directly to their referent, and stop at that? Call a term or a concept ‘radically 
opaque’ if and only if itdoes not reveal any substantive information about its referent.  If there are 
two distinct but co-referring radically opaque terms, then putting them together with an identity 
sign between them would give rise to a strong necessity. Perhaps ‘Cicero is Tully’ is like this: its 
falsity is conceivable—because there is not enough a priori accessible information about ‘Cicero’ and 
‘Tully’ to know without empirical investigation whether or not they are identical—but there is also 
not enough extra content to produce a ‘surrogate possibility’ that Cicero is not Tully. It seems like 
Chalmers owes us an argument here as to why there couldn’t be such strong necessities formed 
withradically opaque terms. 
 
Chalmers sometimespresents his view as endorsed by Kripke in Naming and Necessity (Chalmers 
1996 p. 149, 2010 p. 171).  But there is very strong textual evidence that Kripke was perfectly open 
to the possibility of strong necessities involving radically opaque terms, and that his own anti-
physicalist argument at the end of Naming and Necessityproceeds differently from Chalmers’ 
(Papineau 2007).  In any case, something more than an appeal to authority is needed for a principle 
that promises to refute mind-brain physicalism. 
 
At this point, much of the literature degenerates into debates about cases.  Defenders of strong 
necessities offer examples designed to show that, outside of the mind-body case, there are strong 
necessities involving radically opaque terms: plausible examples of radically opaque terms include 
proper names, demonstratives, and observational terms.  Chalmers responds, in each case, by 
proposing extra content for the alleged radically opaque terms which could be used to form 
surrogate possibilities, for example, arguing that ‘Cicero’ is a priori associated with the property of 
being the individual causally connected in the right way with the term ‘Cicero’. 
 
But this debate about cases is inevitably inconclusive.  For one thing, it is unclear, to say the least, 
what principles govern the attribution of such extra content to terms.  And in any case there is no 
reason why this debate should decide the issue.  Suppose it were agreed on all sides that there are 
no strong necessities outside the mind-brain context.  Why shouldn’t it still be open to a posteriori 
physicalists to hold that mind-brain necessities are an exception?  Why shouldn’t they argue that 
there is something special about the way we refer to phenomenal properties that yields, unusually, 
radically opaque concepts and so conceivabilities unaccompanied by any corresponding real 
possibility? 
 
1.3 The Argument from Modal MonismAs Chalmers himself recognizes, a convincing case against 
strong necessities needs some principled basis.  He aims to provide this at the end of ‘The Two-
Dimensional Argument against Materialism’, in the section on ‘Modal Rationalism’. The thrust of the 
argument is that admitting strong necessities would prevent us from giving a unified account of both 
metaphysical and epistemic modality. 
 
Chalmers’ thought is this.  We start with one simple space of logically possible worlds: all the worlds 
that are conceivable.  Then for each statement we can define a ‘primary intension’ and a ‘secondary 
intension’.  Intensions for statements are functions from worlds to truth values.  The primary 
intension is true at a world if the statement comes out true if that world is taken to be a way the 
world actually turns out to be: if we consider the world where the colourless, odourless stuff in 
oceans and lakes is XYZ as a way that actual world has turned out, then ‘Water is H2O’ is false. The 
secondary intension is true at a world if the statement comes out true if that world is considered as 
a way the world isn’t but might have been (which involves bearing in mind the empirical facts about 
how the actual world is): if we consider the world where the colourless, odourless stuff in oceans 
and lakes is XYZ as a way things might have been (whilst bearing in mind that the actual colourless, 
odourless stuff in oceans and lakes is H2O) ‘Water is H2O’ remains true.
1 
 
Chalmers hopes that this apparatus can allow us to explain both metaphysical and epistemic 
necessity in terms of the same space of possible worlds: a statement is epistemically necessary if and 
only if its primary intension is true at all worlds, and metaphysically necessary if and only if its 
secondary intension is true at all worlds.  But note that this uniform explanation would be blocked if 
there were any strong necessities.  If there is no possible world where ‘Cicero ≠ Tully’ is true, then 
we cannot explain its epistemic possibility in terms of the truth of its primary intension at that world.  
 
Of course, we could still posit two different spaces of worlds—the ‘scenarios’ corresponding to what 
is conceivable, and the possible worlds corresponding to what is genuinely possible—and then 
trivially analyse epistemic necessity as truth at all ‘scenarios’, and metaphysical necessity as truth at 
all genuinely possible worlds.  But Chalmers argues that this would lose the simplicity of the uniform 
explanation, since it requires the arbitrary postulation of a limited range of metaphysically possible 
worlds which is narrower than the familiar space of epistemically possible worlds. If we allow for 
strong necessities, we must be ‘modal dualists’ committed to two different spaces of worlds rather 
than ‘modal monists’. 
 
Opponents may respond that this loss of simplicity is only to be expected, given that metaphysical 
and epistemic modality are quite different.  But Chalmers does not accept that there is a deep divide 
here.  From his point of view, both kinds of modality are grounded in what is conceivable, with a 
little twist added by secondary intensions.  As he puts it: 
 
Epistemic possibility involves what conceivably might be the case, and subjunctive possibility 
involves what conceivably might have been the case.  Both are ultimately grounded in what it 
is rationally coherent to suppose (2010 p. 187). 
 
Neither of us ispersuaded by the argument against modal dualism and strong necessities, but for 
different reasons.  And so at this point the co-authored paper branches into two distinct pieces, each 
written by (more or less) one author. 
 
Philip Goff, author of section 2, is happy to accept that there is indeed a close link between 
metaphysical modality and conceivability, but holds that this link need not rule out strong 
necessities. 
 
David Papineau, author of section 3, doesn’t think that metaphysical modality has anythingto do 
with conceivability in the first place, and so denies the initial motivation for the argument against 
strong necessities. 
 
2 Stress-Free Modal Dualism by Philip Goff 
 
2.1  Transparent and Opaque ConceptionsWhat Chalmers finds stressful about modal dualism is its 
supposed commitment to a primitive notion of metaphysical modality which cannot be analysed in 
terms of conceivability. But modal dualism need not have this troubling feature. I will now describe a 
kind of modal dualism, which I will call ‘stress-free modal dualism’, which does not involve a 
                                                          
1
 Chalmers takes worlds considered as actual to be ‘centred worlds’ (Chalmers 2010, pp. 546-7), but we will 
put this detail to one side for the sake of keeping things simple. 
commitment to primitive metaphysical modality that can’t be analysed in terms of conceivability. So 
even if Chalmers is right that we ought not to believe in primitive metaphysical modality, we can still 
be modal dualists. 
 
At the heart of stress-free modal dualism is the distinction between transparent andopaque 
conceptions. The rough and ready definition of a transparent conception is as follows: you’re having 
a transparent conception if and only if you know what you’re conceiving of. More precisely we can 
say a transparent conception only involves concepts such that: 
 
(i) If the concept refers to a property, then it reveals what it is for an object to have that 
property (i.e. it is a priori for someone possessing the concept, in virtue of possessing the 
concept, what it is for an object to have that property). 
(ii) If the concept refers to an object, then it reveals all the essential properties of that object 
(i.e. for any essential property P of the object referred to O,it is a priori for someone 
possessing the concept, in virtue of possessing the concept, both what it is for an object to 
have P, and also that P is an essential property of O). 
(iii) For any two object-denoting concepts,X and Y, it is a priori whether or not X and Y co-refer.2 
 
To conceive of a Euclidean sphere as such is to have a transparent conception: the conceptEuclidean 
sphere reveals what it is for an object to be spherical in Euclidean geometry(for an object to 
spherical in Euclidean geometry is for it to have all points on its surface equidistant from its centre). 
If I go on to think of a Euclidean sphere as David’s favourite shape then my conception ceases to be 
transparent: the concept David’s favourite shapedoes not reveal what it is for an object to have the 
quality it denotes. 
 
The stress-free modal dualist believes in two modal spaces: a narrow space of metaphysically 
possible worlds, and a broader space of epistemically possible scenarios. But crucially the distinction 
between the two modal spaces is defined in epistemic terms. The scenarios are the worlds that can 
be conceived of tout court, whilst the metaphysically possible worlds are those which can be 
conceived of under a transparent conception. We might say that the scenarios are the 
‘merely’conceivable worlds, whilst the metaphysically possible worlds are the ‘really’ (as in ‘real’ 
beer)3 conceivable worlds—that is, those worlds which remain conceivable when we know what 
we’re conceiving of. 
 
It is conceivable that water is not H2O, but this conception does not correspond to a genuine 
possibility. According to the stress-free modal dualist, this is because when one conceives of water 
as water one is not having a transparent conception: the concept water does not reveal the essence 
                                                          
2
 It is not clear that we can have a transparent concept of a particular object, because it is not clear that we can 
give sense to the notion that there is something to be understood that constitutes what it is for, say,particular 
electron x – as opposed to particular electron y – to exist (even though electrons have essential properties, 
such properties do not serve to distinguish one particular electron from another). The notion of a transparent 
conception seems to make sense for concepts which denote properties and kinds, but not for concepts which 
denote particulars (unless something like Leibniz’s view is true according to which a particular object has a real 
definition).However, we can distinguish amongst conceptions involving object-denoting concepts,between 
those which are transparent and those which involve opacity. Insofar as we have involved in our conception 
two object-denoting concepts, ‘X’ and ‘Y’, such that we don’t know a priori whether or not ‘X’ and ‘Y’ co-refer, 
to that degree our conception involves opacity: there is something we don’t know about the scenario we are 
conceiving of, i.e. we don’t know whether or not X is identical to Y. This is why stipulation (iii) is required in the 
above definition of a transparent conception. 
3
 The point being that beer that’s not ‘real’ is not fake, just not ‘the genuine article.’ Thanks to Daniel Hill for 
suggesting that there should be a little clarification here. 
of its referent. If the same state of affairs is thought of under a transparent conception, i.e. thought 
of as H2O is not H2O,
4 it ceases to be conceivable.  
 
It is conceivable that there be a million-sided object, and this conception does correspond to a 
genuine possibility. According to a stress-free modal dualist, this is because when one conceives a 
million-sided object—without characterising the object in any more detail—one is having a 
transparent conception: someone who possesses the concept million-sided objectknows what it is 
for an object to have a million sides.5 
 
For the stress-free modal dualist, metaphysical possibility just is conceivability under a transparent 
conception. Clearly this form of modal dualism doesn’t involve a primitive notion of metaphysical 
modality: metaphysical possibility is just a more determinate form of conceivability.6 
 
2.2  Modal Monism Versus Stress-Free Modal Dualism  How do we decide whether Chalmers-style 
modal monism or stress-free modal dualism is true? Note that both of them avoid the stress of a 
commitment to primitive metaphysical modality. One might think we should still go for Chalmers-
stylemodal monism for reasons of economy: we only have to believe in a single space of worlds. 
However, I don’t think economy should be a concern here, as neither view ontologically commits to 
the fundamental existence of worlds or scenarios. Both Chalmers-style modal monism and stress-
free modal dualism reduce possibility to conceivability: for there to be a world/scenario is for that 
world/scenario to be conceivable (according to stress-free modal dualism, for there to be a scenario 
is for that scenario to be merely conceivable, for there to be a metaphysically possible world is for 
that world to be really conceivable). The only concern is that we have an analysis that captures the 
space of what is conceivable.  
 
Chalmers-style modal monism will be inadequate if there are radically opaque terms or concepts, or 
at least if there are distinct but co-referring radically opaque terms or concepts. As was explained in 
section 1, if ‘Cicero’ and ‘Tully’ are radically opaque terms—if neither expresses non-trivial 
properties of its referent—then we can put them together with an identity sign between them to 
form a strong necessity. 
 
But the existence of radically opaque terms is not a problem for the stress-free modal dualist. The 
fact that Cicero is not Tully is conceivable but not possible is to be explained in terms of the opacity 
introduced into the conception by the concepts involved. Perhaps ‘Cicero’ and ‘Tully’ are radically 
opaque, i.e. do not reveal any substantive information about their referents. Perhaps ‘Cicero’ and 
‘Tully’ are merely mildlyopaque: each reveals a substantive accidental property of its referent—from 
which a ‘surrogate’ possibility can be constructed (see section 1.2)—but there is not enough a priori 
accessible information to know that the two terms co-refer. In the former case, ‘Cicero is Tully’ is a 
strong necessity, in the latter case it isn’t. Either way, the stress-free modal dualist has no difficulty.7 
 
                                                          
4
 Actually, it is not obvious that to conceive of water as H2O is to have a transparent conception of water: it 
may be that our chemical concepts refer by description. In this case, we can imagine replacing the concept of 
water with a concept of H2O that conceives of it in terms of its intrinsic nature. 
5
 I develop this framework in greater detail in Goff MS. 
6
 This reduction of possibility to conceivability would be straightforwardly circular if we rely on a modal 
conception of essence (as a transparent conception involves knowing the essence of an object). Hence the 
stress-free modal dualist must ascribe to a definitional, rather than a modal, understanding of essence (see 
Fine 1994 for this distinction). 
7
 For more on the difference between transparent, mildly opaque and radically opaque concepts, see Goff 
2011 and Goff MS. 
If we want to analyse metaphysical possibility in terms of conceivability, then whether we go for 
Chalmers-style modal monism or stress-free modal dualism will at least in part depend on whether 
or not there are radically opaque terms or concepts. 
 
2.3 Back to the ImpasseWe are back then to the impasse, and the long sequence of suggested 
counterexamples. Chalmers’ opponents propose strong necessities involving radically opaque terms 
or concepts, Chalmers proposes an alternative analysis according to which the apparently naughty 
terms or concepts are in fact associated with certain accidental features of their referents, and it is 
not clear where the onus lies. We can now see that Chalmers is wrong to think that worries about 
primitive metaphysical modality can put the onus on his opponents, because stress-free modal 
dualists can happily accept the existence of radically opaque terms without needing to commit to a 
primitive notion of metaphysical modality which can’t be analysed in terms of conceivability. 
 
In fact, in the absence of any other considerations, it would seem that the semantic theories of 
Chalmers’ opponents which imply the existence of radically opaque terms and hence strong 
impossibilities have a significant advantage: they offer hope that the conceivability of zombies is 
consistent with the truth of physicalism. If ‘Cicero’ and ‘Tully’ are bothradically opaque terms, then 
‘Cicero is Tully’ is conceivably false even though there is no genuine possibility corresponding to its 
falsity. Similarly, if ‘pain’ and ‘c-fibre firing’ are radically opaque terms which co-refer, then ‘Pain is c-
fibre firing’ is conceivably false even though there is no genuine possibility corresponding to its 
falsity. It seems, therefore, that Chalmers had better find another way of putting the onus on his 
opponents.   
 
Alternatively, if the stress-free modal dualist can demonstrate that we have a transparent 
conception of both pain and c-fibres firing, then she can infer from the conceivability of their 
separation, to the genuine possibility of their separation (given that for the stress-free modal dualist, 
metaphysical possibility just is conceivability under a transparent conception). This is the strategy for 
attacking physicalism that I myself favour (Goff 2011/MS).8 
 
3 Modality is Nothing to do with Conceivability by David Papineau 
 
3.1 Genuinely Metaphysical Modality  I shall defend strong necessities by arguing that metaphysical 
modality has nothing to do with conceivability.  My positive view is that metaphysical modality is 
grounded in counterfactual thinking9, and that counterfactual thinking is primarily geared to reflect 
the causal structure of the world.  From this perspective, metaphysical modality charts the limits of 
alternative histories of the world, in the sense of how things could have gone differently from a 
causal point of view.  If this is right, then it is unsurprising that the metaphysical possibilities should 
diverge from the epistemic ones.  There is no reason why what we can conceive should be much of a 
guide to the space of causal alternatives. 
 
To take this line is not simply to posit some ‘primitive’ notion of modality separate from 
conceivability.  On the contrary, this line promises a definite explanation for the divergence between 
modal possibility and conceivability, in terms of the link between metaphysical modality and 
counterfactual and causal reasoning. 
 
                                                          
8
 I would like to thank David Papineau, Sam Coleman, Paul Coates, Barry Dainton, Mary Leng, Daniel Hill, 
Stephen McLeod, and all the participants in talks I gave on this topic at the University of Hertfordshire and the 
University of Liverpool. I started this paper as a Post Doctoral Research Fellow on the AHRC project 
‘Phenomenal Qualities’ at the University of Hertfordshire, and I am very grateful for the opportunity this 
position afforded me to develop my research. 
9
Cf Williamson, 2007, ch 5. 
Right at the end of ‘The Two-Dimensional Argument against Physicalism’, Chalmers expresses doubts 
about the prospects for non-conceivability explanations of modality, and in particular about whether 
they can avoid collapsing metaphysical possibility into natural possibility.   In my view, this 
pessimism is misplaced.  However, there is no question of demonstrating this by producing a full-
fledged positive non-conceivability account of metaphysical modality in the space available here.  
Still, perhaps I can do something to motivate such an account, by showing that there are some 
obvious features of metaphysical modality that resist explanation in terms of conceivability. 
 
3.2 Father and BirthplacesFor Chalmers,we get metaphysical modality when we consider worlds 
counterfactually (what ‘conceivably might have been the case’) and epistemic modality when we 
consider worlds as actual (what ‘conceivably might be the case’).  He sees these simply as two 
different dimensions to conceivability, which is why he holds that the same space of worlds is 
involved and strong necessities therefore ruled out.   
 
However, in the presentcontext we can scarcely take ‘worlds’ and ‘ways of considering them’ as 
given.  Chalmers is supposed to be giving us an argument that the same ‘worlds’ are involved in both 
‘ways of considering’ them, an argument which presumably hinges on the idea that ‘counterfactual 
way of considering worlds’reflect independently given facts of conceivability just as much as 
‘considering worlds as actual’.  
 
But it is not at all clear, to say the least, how the counterfactual way of considering worlds is 
supposed to be grounded in facts of conceivability.  For example, consider the claim that ‘David 
Papineau’s father is Owen Papineau’.  This states a metaphysical necessity because the ‘secondary 
intension’ of ‘David Papineau’ picks out the person David Papineau at all possible worlds and there 
are no possible worlds where that person’s father is not Owen Papineau10.  That is, when we 
consider ‘worlds as counterfactual’, ‘David Papineau’ never refers to someone who does not have 
Owen Papineau as a father. 
 
But where did that come from?  How are independently given facts of conceivability supposed to tell 
us that there are no possible worlds where David Papineau’s father is not Owen Papineau?  By way 
of comparison, note that there are plenty of possible worlds where David Papineau’s birthplace is 
different from Como, his actual birthplace.  So why are we entitled to assume that parents are 
necessary to people, but not birthplaces?  This doesn’t look like anything to do with conceivability.  
After all, it is no less conceivable that David Papineau’s father is other than Owen than that his 
birthplace is other than Como.  In the absence of some further story here, it looks as if the 
explanation of metaphysical modality in terms of secondary intensions, far from being grounded in 
facts of conceivability, is simply tracking some independently given structure of metaphysically 
modal facts. 
 
Of course this does not yet decide the issue.  Those who think that metaphysical possibility is 
grounded in conceivability will admit that the connection is not straightforward.  After all, we all 
know, following Kripke, that possibility cannot be read straight off from conceivability—it is scarcely 
news that the conceivability of David Papineau’s being sired by someone other than Owen does not 
guarantee its possibility.  So, if there is a connection between metaphysical possibility and 
conceivability, it can’t just be that the latter implies the former.     
 
But what then is the connection?  What exactly does conceivability have to do with the impossibility 
of my having a different father,but not a different birthplace? Even though both are initially 
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  I shall assume for the sake of the argument that parents are essential to their children.  If you have doubts 
about this, feel free to substitute your favourite species of de re necessity.   The argument will work equally 
well with any de re necessity, including identities (which are discussed explicitly in 3.4 below). 
conceivable, is there some further sense in which my having a different father that Owen is 
neverthelessless conceivable than my having a different birthplace than Como? 
 
Perhaps the idea is that, once we know the relevant a posteriori facts, then different fathers are 
rendered inconceivable in a way that different birthplaces are not.  After it is given that David 
Papineau’s father is Owen and that his birthplace is Como, then it ceases to be conceivable that he 
has a different father, but not that he has a different birthplace. 
 
But this suggestion does not bear much examination.  Let us assume that my father is Owen 
Papineau.  This supposition does indeed rule out that my father not be Owen.  After all,‘David 
Papineau’s father is Owen and his father is not Owen’ is a straight contradiction.  But exactly the 
same applies to birthplaces.  Assume my birthplace is Como.  This assumption now similarly rules out 
that I am born elsewhere, for ‘David Papineau’s birthplace is Como and his birthplace is not Como’ is 
equally a straight contradiction.  Assuming the empirical facts doesn’t seem to take us any closer to 
an asymmetry in conceivability which might explain why parents but not birthplaces are necessary.11 
 
I have heard it proposed that an asymmetry will emerge if we make sure we are dealing with dere 
propositions.  But this does not help either, as long as what is at issue is the conceivability of de re 
non-modal contents (I will come to modal contents in a second).  I take it that a de re proposition is a 
singular proposition, for instance one that has the particular person David Papineau as part of its 
content.  Well, focus on such propositions as much as you like—make sure you are thinking of David 
Papineau, that particular person.  It surely remains conceivable both that his father not be Owen and 
his birthplace not be Como, while it remains inconceivablethat his father is Owen and not Owen, and 
that his birthplace is Como and not Como.  Again, we seem to lack any asymmetry in conceivability 
with which to account for the different modal status of parents and birthplaces. 
 
3.3 Inconceivable Modal ContentsWhat about the contrast between ‘David Papineau has a different 
birthplace than his actual birthplace’ and ‘David Papineau has a different father than his actual 
father’?  Well, now we do plausibly get an asymmetry in conceivability.  It is conceivable that David 
Papineau was born somewhere different from his actual birthplace, but not that he was sired by 
someone different from his actual father.  However, this is no good for those who want to explain 
metaphysical modality in terms of conceivability.  If such an explanation is not to be trivial, the 
statements whose conceivability or inconceivability is supposed to ground modal possibilities or 
necessities had better not themselves contain modal notions.  The references to actualityin the 
statements above violate this requirement. 
 
The point is clearest if we consider such ‘modal introduction conditionals’ as:  ‘Ifwater is H2O, then 
necessarily water is H2O’ or ‘If David Papineau’s father is Owen Papineau, then necessarilyDavid 
Papineau’s father is OwenPapineau’.  Nothing in my position requires me to deny that these claims 
are a priori and their negations inconceivable.  But this is not what is needed for an explanation of 
metaphysical modality in terms of conceivability.  Such an explanation is supposed to explain the 
nature of modality in terms of the conceivability or inconceivability of non-modal claims.  The 
conceivability or otherwise of claims with explicitly modal contents is beside the point.  Such claims 
simply take for granted the modal notions that we are trying to analyse.     
 
The same point applies, if not quite so obviously, to the suggested explanation of the modal 
asymmetry between fathers and birthplaces in terms of the differential conceivability of particular 
people lacking their actual fathers or birthplaces.  To talk of fathers or birthplaces that are 
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CfSonia Roca-Royes’incisive and wide-ranging‘Conceivability and de re modal knowledge’ (2011) which 
argues in far greater detail than is possible here that the supposition of such facts as that water is H2O in no 
sense renders their negations inconceivable 
differentfrom actual ones is already to trade in modal notions, since this talk refers to the putative 
fathers and birthplaces that you might possibly have had.  Again, such talk assumes just the kind of 
modal notions whose content we are trying to be elucidate. 
 
Perhaps it is worth dwelling on this point for a moment.  Let us suppose, for the sake of the 
argument, that the structure of the modal realm is indeed determined quite independently of 
anything to do with conceivability, perhaps in some such way as suggested at the beginning of this 
section.  Then of course it is open to us to form concepts—such as necessary, possible, actual, and so 
on—to refer to aspects of what we take this modal realm to contain.  And then no doubt certain 
claims involving these concepts will become inconceivable for us (‘You could have been sired by 
someone different from your actual father’).  But this does not mean that the realm that these 
concepts refer to itself depends in any way on what is conceivable. 
 
Consider an analogy.  Suppose that we coin the concept metabolicto pick out facts which involve the 
workings of living bodies.  Then it will presumably become inconceivable, say, that ‘Human blood 
circulates oxygen, yet it is not metabolic that human blood circulates oxygen’.  But this surely does 
not show that the metabolic facts are grounded in what is conceivable, in the way that Chalmers 
holds the metaphysically modal facts are.12 
 
What about Philip Goff’s suggestion in the last section that metaphysical possibility can be grounded 
specifically in what istransparently conceivable?  The points I have made so far do not bear directly 
on this thesis, as transparent conceivability is not guaranteed by ordinary conceivability.  Maybe 
‘David Papineau’s father is not Owen Papineau’ is ordinarily conceivable, but not transparently 
conceivable, in line with the idea that only transparent conceivability ensures metaphysical 
possibility. 
 
However, my argument so far does put a significant amount of pressure on the idea of transparent 
concepts.  To account for the metaphysical possibility of David Papineau being born somewhere else 
than Como, we will need a transparent concept that renders this conceivable.  But we don’t want 
this same transparent concept to render it conceivable that David Papineau’s father not be Owen 
Papineau, on pain of ending up with a corresponding metaphysical possibility.  So it looks as if 
transparent concepts of particular people will have to include information about their parents, but 
not about their birthplaces.  You are only conceiving David Papineautransparently when you 
conceive him as having Owen as his father, though you can well conceive him transparently without 
knowing Como is his birthplace.  It is an interesting question whether these constraints on 
transparent concepts can be independently motivated, as opposed to simply being read off what we 
already know about the space of metaphysical modality.  Such a motivation will be needed to allay 
the suspicion that the relevant notion of a ‘transparent’ concept has simply been cooked up to 
deliver the right modal answers and therefore fails to offer a genuine explanation of metaphysical 
modality. 
 
3.4 Two Different SpacesSome readers may have been wondering whether the disconnection 
between conceivability and possibility isspecific to de re modality, and whether it cantherefore be 
put to one side as a special case. 
 
Well, the disconnection is indeed specific to de re modality.  If we put de re modal claims to one 
side, then necessary truth would line up nicely with a priority, and contingency with a posteriority, 
                                                          
12
In 2010 footnote 3 p. 188 Chalmers suggests that specific modal profiles are associated a priori with names of 
spatiotemporal objects (his example are ‘Goliath’ for the statue and ‘Lump’ for the piece of clay).  This seems 
right.  But,as above, this will yield no explanation of modal facts in terms of the conceivability of non-modal 
contents, given that the concepts expressed by the relevant names will contain explicitly modal information. 
which would leave us with no a posteriori necessities of any kind, and so a fortiori no strong 
necessities. 
 
However, in the present contextof argument, de re modality can scarcely be viewed as a special 
case.  Chalmers’ anti-physicalist case hinges crucially on the thesis that the conceivability-possibility 
link applies in the de re realm as much as elsewhere.  (Thus his physicalist opponents maintain that 
certain de re brain-mind claims are necessarily true though conceivably false; Chalmers retorts that 
even in these de re cases conceivable falsity must point to a genuine possibility of brain-mind 
dissociation.) 
 
What if we focus on the necessity of identity?  Maybe such esoteric de re necessities as the necessity 
of parents can’t be grounded in conceivability.  But perhaps the more basic necessity of identity can 
be so grounded.  And maybe this will be enough for Chalmers.  Physicalism isn’t always phrased as 
an identity thesis.  But it can arguably always be forced into this mode.13  So perhaps it will suffice to 
block physicalism if it can be argued that, for identity claims at least, modality is grounded in 
conceivability, and strongly necessary a posteriori identities are therefore unacceptable.  
 
But the points made so far allow us to see that even the necessity of identity is nothing to do with 
conceivability.  Of course, when we ‘consider worlds counterfactually’, we will find none where 
Cicero is not Tully.  But this cannot be explained in terms of inconceivability.  Just as ‘secondary 
intensions’ needed to be constructed post-hoc to track such independently-fixed de re modal facts 
as that parents are necessary to their offspring, so too do they need to be constructed post-hoc to 
track the independently-fixed necessity of identity.  I argued earlier that appeals to conceivability do 
nothing to explain why there are no metaphysicallypossible worlds where David Papineau’s father is 
not Owen.  By the same coin, appeals to conceivability cast no light on the lack of anymetaphysically 
possible worlds where Cicero is not Tully. 
 
Of course, the necessity of identity is forced on us as soon as we allow that the same entities can be 
denizens of different ‘possible worlds’.  Once we countenance such trans-world existence, then it is 
open to us to quantify into modal contexts, or to construct rigid designators which track such 
entities across worlds—and then a familiar argument which appeals to no more than the 
indiscernibility of identicals takes us quickly to the necessity of identity. 
 
But there is nothing in considerations of conceivability themselves to call for trans-world existence.  
Trans-world existence is needed to deal with de re necessities, not to track questions of 
conceivability. 
 
Remember that it is conceivable that ‘Cicero ≠ Tully’.  So, as far as conceivable scenarios go, we need 
to admit a scenario which contains both a ‘Cicero’ and a different ‘Tully’.  Is either of these 
personages the same entity as the real Cicero?  If we are working only with scenarios generated by 
facts of conceivability, this looks like a funny question.  This is because the apparatus of conceivable 
scenarios does not itself require us to suppose that real people (such as the actual Cicero) can be 
denizens of non-actual scenarios. 
 
The reason we want to allow that real people can inhabit non-actual worlds is not to model 
conceivability, but precisely to let us address such de re modal questions as whether Cicero, that 
very person, might have had a different father, or a different birthplace.  Trans-world existence, and 
the necessity of identity which follows, are thus corollaries of our concern with de re modal 
questions, and so no more grounded in questions of conceivability than they are.  We need them to 
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CfPapineau 2011 footnote 1. 
state which features of things are necessary and which merely possible.  But we could do perfectly 
without them if our only concern were with conceivability. 
 
Earlier I floated the idea that metaphysical modality reflects facts about the realm of alternative 
causal histories.  Unfortunately there has been no opportunity to offer any positive defence of this 
suggestion here.  Still, I hope that my arguments have at least cast some doubt on the alternative 
view that metaphysical modality reflects facts about conceivability and should therefore be 
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